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INTER-ALLIED GOALS FOR A

By **Harold Brown**
Secretary of Defense

This article by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was adapted from his Sept. 21, 1978, statement to the Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee.

NATO Forces working together in the field ensure interoperability through dual production of weapons and equipment (such as the F-16 aircraft above) which eliminates redundant investments. The concept may also provide lower unit costs for the Atlantic Alliance through longer production runs.

STRONG NATO DEFENSE

Today in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) we have an unparalleled alliance of 15 countries which have preserved world peace for 29 years. The United States is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance for two reasons:

- We share with our 14 allies a respect for human rights and political freedom, and a determination to preserve them. These goals are paired with military self-defense.

- By working with our Allies, we can maintain collectively a stronger military barrier to aggression than we could by ourselves.

There can be no effective defense of Europe that does not involve the U.S. and any viable long-run defense of the U.S. would be doubtful unless Europe, too, remains free. Separately we could not match the military and geopolitical power of the Warsaw Pact. But together we can do at least that well, if we are willing to work at it.

I believe we all agree on these basic reasons for maintaining our alliance. But there is a major secondary issue: how to share the burden.

That has been a difficult problem for any alliance, and has proved the downfall of many. Certainly it is difficult to compare, with each other or with our own, the Alliance contributions of diverse national entities. Examples are Norway—which has only about 4 million people spread over a rugged country 1500 miles long; the Federal Republic of Germany—which provides about half the combat divisions in the central region, as well as the territory for basing and exercising all Alliance forces in that critical area; and Turkey—which has little industry, but maintains a large force under arms on NATO's southern flank.

The U.S. has over half of the Alliance gross national product; we provide well over 60 percent of Alliance defense spending. Some part of that, however, goes to maintain national interests and independent capabilities that are not immediately part of our alliance commitment. Moreover, we contribute only about 40 percent of the men under arms.

In the Alliance councils, U.S. representatives have pointed out what we are doing to strengthen the Alliance, and are urging our friends to increase their contributions. But, not surprisingly, many of our allies often see the picture differently, since they are more aware of their increased efforts.

Last year we, along with our allies, pledged to seek a real

DEFENSE news briefs

Army Recruiters Get Bigger Job

Army's year long experiment of combining active force and reserve force recruiting efforts in 10 districts has proved so successful that Army decided to go with the program Army-wide.

U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) now has the entire recruiting responsibility, a change that involves the transfer of 1,350 military personnel and some 445 civilians from Army Forces Command to USAREC.

Privacy Act Problems

A Marine Corps study found that the flaw in current recruiting is not so much malpractice as it is the recruiter's inability to checkout the applicant's statements.

Many school and police jurisdictions simply take a strict approach to the Privacy Act and provide no personal information. It leaves recruiters with no means of checking out statements.

Malpractice exists when a recruiter coaches the applicant, mindful that there is no way a school record or police record could be checked.

Marines feel that other Services also face the same verification problem and that legislative relief will be needed to weed out fraudulent enlistments.

More Eagles On Duty

33rd Tactical Fighter Wing at Eglin AFB, Fla., not only loses its F-4s for new F-15 Eagles but also loses its air defense mission.

The mission changes also affected a detachment of F-106s at New Orleans, La., which moved to Tyndall AFB, Fla., and a Texas Air National Guard outfit with F-101s at Houston, which now has the New Orleans defense mission.

Absentia Discharge Policy

"Desertion is still a serious offense in the military Service. . . . . The Secretary of Defense placed narrow limits on such discharges (in absentia) by authorizing them only when prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations . . . or to serve the national interests . . . limited to alien deserters who had gone to foreign countries where the United States had no authority to apprehend them."

So testified the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy) Maj. Gen. Stanley M. Umstead, Jr., USAF, before a House Subcommittee this fall.

He said a joint-Service study made in Sept. 1977 weighed such factors as impacts on discipline, attrition rates, manpower costs and impending reduced support by the FBI to apprehend deserters.

The study suggests a new policy of combining a joint-Service deserter apprehension program with a discharge-in-absentia provision after 18 months, at Secretary of Defense discretion, on a case-by-case basis.

But the general noted that none of the Services have made use of this provision even though there are 3,400 eligibles.

Stateside Maneuver Site

Army has filed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) to establish a military National Training Center (NTC) at one of three sites: Twenty Nine Palms Marine Corps Base, Calif.; Yuma Proving Grounds, Ariz.; Fort Irwin, Calif.

The Army DEIS report said that Fort Irwin is its preferred site for the NTC.

Army wants a training area where the total combat environment of modern warfare, present and future, can be realistically simulated.

Plans call for 42 combat battalions, roughly 80,000 people, to rotate through the NTC each year on two-week training sessions.

While Army has filed the DEIS, the first step in establishing the NTC, final approval must still be obtained from the Secretary of Defense.

Belleau Wood Returns To the Corps

Navy has commissioned the third of its super LHA amphibious assault ships, which by itself, can substitute for four older type landing ships.

The third of the protected five LHAs joined the fleet at Pascagoula, Miss., Sept. 23, 1978, when the USS Belleau Wood was commissioned.

Appropriately named after the World War I battle in which the Marines were outstanding, the giant 820 ft. long ship, 20 stories high, and with a flight deck, can land Marines by helicopter or boats, or a combination of both.

The Belleau Wood also packs three five inch guns and is studded with anti-aircraft missiles and 20 mm. flak cannons.

Armed Forces Strength

Total numerical strength of the Armed Forces is still holding at slightly above the two million mark—at 2,062,071 as of Aug. 31, 1978.

	Aug. 31, 1978 preliminary	July 31, 1978	Aug. 31, 1977
Total DoD	2,062,071	2,061,579	2,073,350
Army	770,553	769,214	781,688
Navy	529,974	527,148	528,002
Marine Corps	190,273	190,379	191,658
Air Force	571,271	574,838	572,002

The figures represent full time military personnel comprising both regulars and reserves on continous active duty and officer candidates including cadets at the Military and Air Academies and Midshipmen at the Naval Academy.

annual increase in defense spending on the order of 3 percent in order to respond at least partially to the annual rate of increase of 4 percent or more maintained by the Soviets for nearly 20 years running. That is a burden proportioned to the past efforts of the participants, and it offers one measure of burden-sharing.

There is also the task of coordinating the individual national contributions. If we do not work together, we risk failure of our efforts to deter attack. Even a 10 percent or 20 percent real increase in resources would fail to be effective if each ally went off in a different direction.

This need for coordinating or rationalizing Alliance efforts is sometime more difficult for the U.S. to accept than for the other partners. We are bigger and more independent. In the past we have been able to do everything our own way and still succeed. Or at least so it may have seemed. Sometimes we forget the major contributions our allies have made to defense technology through the years—such as the British invention of radar and Chobham armor, German advances on guns, the French development of wire-guided anti-tank weapons, and missiles like the French-German **ROLAND.**

Today it is clear that we need a new attitude. There has been a major improvement in Soviet military capability over the past decade. In the light of that fact, NATO's military ability to deter will depend in great part upon the rational design and utilization of all of our national forces under NATO-agreed priorities. How well we will achieve that result depends upon the degree of cooperation attained within NATO in defense matters.

We and our allies no longer can count on having much time to prepare our defenses. The Soviet theater forces have changed most significantly, not only in numbers, but in their ability to wage short, intense, non-nuclear campaigns using large, modernized forces, with relatively little advance preparation. In consequence, a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact has become more feasible. Our needs have changed accordingly: toward higher combat-readiness, ability to sustain a defense in high intensity warfare, improved interoperability with allies, and more long-range mobility for that half of the Alliance based in the Western Hemisphere over 3,000 miles away. We must keep the size of our forces, their modernization, their readiness (including their mobility) and their sustainability in balance—especially when the threat of short-warning attacks has increased. Spending money on spare parts, unit training, and field exercises may not produce headlines, but considering the investment we already are making in hardware, we now need to make those expenditures.

The NATO Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) endorsed by Heads of Government at the May, 1978, Washington summit meeting represents a significant step forward in coordinating the use of Allied resources in critical areas. It includes ten detailed programs to provide NATO readiness, reinforcement, technological superiority, and coordinated defense. The LTDP has been put in motion, and NATO now is completing arrangements to monitor program performance.

Key to a successful LTDP is greater Alliance cooperation in armaments to increase the collective efficiency of our forces. Standardization and interoperability are not ends in themselves, but rather are means to increase Alliance military strength.

The Soviet Union rate of investment on military research and development is perhaps double that of the U.S. They are

(Continued on page 9)

Our NATO allies have made significant contributions to the Alliance defense technology through such advances as the German development of guns and the missiles like the French-German ROLAND, shown being fired below.

On June 16, 1978, President Carter and General Torrijos, Panama's Chief of Government, signed the Instruments of Ratification for the new Panama Canal Treaty and for the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (the Neutrality Treaty). These instruments will be effective Mar. 31, 1979, and the Canal treaties will enter into force on Oct. 1, 1979.

The Neutrality Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on Mar. 16, 1978, and the new Panama Canal Treaty on Apr. 18, 1978, both by a vote of 68–32. The Panamanian people approved both treaties in a national plebiscite on Oct. 23, 1977.

UPDATE:

During the ceremonies for signing the Instruments of Ratification both President Carter and General Torrijos noted the long and arduous negotiations that led to the two new treaties. The President said that in the past year we sat on opposite sides of the table as negotiators in good faith. Now we sit together as partners, equally committed to make these agreements work.

Since its opening in 1914, the Panama Canal has been an important commercial asset to the United States, Panama, and the rest of the world. Of the total tonnage transiting the Canal in FY 1977, approximately 45 percent originated in and some 26 percent was destined for U.S. ports. Approximately 11 percent of total U. S. waterborne exports and imports by tonnage pass through the Panama Canal. Currently about 32 percent of Panama's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is directly or indirectly attributable to the presence of the Canal (although the share of its GDP attributable to Canal operations has shrunk over the years as other sectors of its economy have expanded).

The relative importance of the Canal to the economies of the U.S. and other nations, as well as to that of Panama, has decreased from earlier years as those economies have grown, trading patterns have shifted and world commerce has become more sophisticated. Some alternatives to the Canal have begun to emerge, including the use of larger ocean-going vessels unable to use the Canal and overland transit by trail, truck, and pipeline across the U.S.

Historically, the Canal has made an important military contribution to our country's security. Although the Canal is too small to accommodate the 13 large aircraft carriers in our fleet, it can accommodate 98 percent of U.S. Navy and all Military Sealift Command ships; and it remains an important defense artery for the timely reinforcement and resupply of U.S. forces. Its strategic advantage continues to lie in the flexibility it provides for shifting military forces and logistic support between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

For the foreseeable future, the Canal will remain a major defense asset and will continue to have significant military value to the U. S. Primary U.S. concern, however, is with the Canal's use not its ownership. Thus, it is in our national interest to see that the Canal continues to function efficiently with reasonable tolls, and be available to our naval shipping at all times.

The new Treaties impact on three elements which together make up U.S. national security concerns relating to the Canal. These elements are unimpeded use; effective Canal operations; and physical security of the Canal.

The first element includes unimpeded use of the Canal both by

our Navy and by our merchant ships. The Neutrality Treaty provides that the Canal shall be open permanently to the vessels of all nations—in times of peace and war. Under the new treaties the U.S. is given a preferred position with respect to use of the Canal, a position which no other country except Panama will enjoy, in that U.S. vessels of war and auxiliary vessels are assured expeditious transit through the Canal to include the right to go to the head of the line in an emergency. These provisions assure that the U.S. can continue to use the Canal in a timely fashion whenever military necessity dictates.

The second element of U.S. national security interests

NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

involving the Canal issue is that the Canal continue to operate effectively. Under the new Panama Canal Treaty, a U.S. Government corporation known as the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) will operate the Canal until noon, Dec. 31, 1999, with increasing participation of Panamanians. This agency will operate under the Treaty terms and according to U.S. laws and regulations, thus assuring the continuing present efficient operation of the Canal. At present 80 percent of the Canal operating force, to include 50 percent of the "white collar" and technical personnel, are Panamanian. The U.S. will train Panamanians in management and operational techniques so that the Canal will continue to function effectively after we turn over operational responsibility to Panama.

The third element is the U.S. security requirement to defend the Canal from hostile acts. While the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone can be defended, the continuous operation of the Canal could not be ensured given a hostile environment that would likely result in any confrontation with Panama. The Canal, with its complex system of locks and dams, is susceptible to varying degrees of damage or disruption and vulnerable to attack from forces or weapons located outside the area of U.S. jurisdiction. Reinforcements would be needed to defend the Canal and the Zone against large scale terrorist or guerilla attacks.

The new Panama Canal Treaty states unequivocally that during the life of that Treaty U.S. Armed Forces have the primary responsibility to defend the Canal. It further provides that, during that period, the U.S. may station, train, and move military units within Panama. The U.S. may modify its force levels in Panama based upon defense requirements. Necessary military bases and training areas which we now operate in the Canal Zone will remain under U.S. control.

Through 1999, a combined defense arrangement between the U.S. and Panama will prevail. It will allow Panama to participate, on an increasing basis, in the defense of the Canal. The required defense plans will be developed in concert to provide for mutual defense of the Canal. The cooperative defense relationship between the U.S. and Panama envisaged under these treaties will provide the basis for the most effective defense of the Canal, especially against terrorists or commando attacks and internal disorders.

After 1999, the Neutrality Treaty provides that no foreign troops, military bases, or military installations will be permitted in Panama and only Panama will operate the Canal. In the Neutrality Treaty the U.S. and Panama agree to maintain the permanent neutrality of the Canal. As a neutrality guarantor, the U.S. would have the right to take appropriate measures to enforce the Canal's neutrality. This provision establishes the United States' right to defend the Canal against any threat. Further, the Protocol to the Neutrality Treaty provides a mechanism for other interested nations to acknowledge and respect the rules of neutrality established therein.

DoD Played Major Role

The DoD played a major role in negotiating the new treaties and is satisfied that they protect U.S. security interests; ensure that, after the Panama Canal Treaty's termination, the waterway will remain open to world shipping without discrimination and at reasonable tolls; and ensure that the U.S. has continuous use of the Canal. The treaties are a gauge of our good faith toward Panama and all of Latin America. They provide the means to establish a new allied relationship with Panama and give that nation an enlarged stake in the continued effective operation and defense of the Canal.

dateline: R&D

Blackhawk Is Back

An Army board has found no design deficiency in the prototype Blackhawk Utility Helicopter that crashed May 19 at Stratford, Conn., killing three Sikorsky Aircraft employees.

Along with this finding, the board authorized resumption of flight testing for the YUH-60A to begin July 26, 1978.

Army determined that the May crash was caused by the malfunctioning of the automatic stabilator control. The Blackhawk has a manual back-up system but for some reason it was not used.

Sulphur Pollutant Testing

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has developed two high sensitive x-ray spectrometers to measure sulfur pollution in the air. One determines the amount of pollution; the other if pollution is a health hazard.

NRL took on the job at the request of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Concern for sulfur pollution as a health hazard is increasing because of the use of some recent oil supplies with impurities.

One of the NRL spectrometers is portable and can be taken to the suspected site. It can also measure as five parts per billion of sulfur-containing particles in the atmosphere.

The second, attached to existing laboratory units, is designed to measure the valence state of sulfur or the sulfur likely to become sulfur dioxide and become a health hazard.

Suspected sulfur sources are power plants switching over from coal to oil and catalytic converters on automobiles, which do a good job on carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions but form up to 0.5 mi of H_2SO_4 for each liter of gasoline burned.

Radar, Infrared Camouflage

"Traditional" camouflage—which tricks the human eye has reached a point of sophistication in military warfare. But what about radar camouflage, thermal camouflage, decoy destruction, camouflage detection and image processing?

That question defines the problem. There are simply no industrial facilities doing the type of research the U.S. Army needs. Therefore, the reason for the construction of a new $1.6 million facility at Ft. Belvoir, Va., is to begin doing this type of research.

The U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command (MERADCOM) at Ft. Belvoir expects its "Camouflage Laboratory" to be ready by next spring.

Side By Side

Roland fire units from each of the three countries building the anti-aircraft guided-missile weapon system were recently brought together for the first time for a "family" photograph at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. In this example of NATO teamwork, a West German unit, mounted on an SPZ armored personnel chassis, is on the left; in the center is a U.S.-built fire unit on an XM975 tracked vehicle; and a French unit, riding an AMX-30 tank chassis, is at the right. Interchangeability of missiles and field replaceable units has been maintained between the U.S. and European weapons systems.

(Continued from page 5)
producing two or three times the quantity of major weapon systems that we are, though we think the U.S. retains a real, though decreasing, edge in quality. Within our Alliance as a whole, we spend our limited resources on the same types of weapons, usually at higher unit costs. In some cases we field less than the best available equipment. It is essential that we stop this waste. It will not be easy, because we are 15 sovereign states, concerned not only with an adequate defense, but also with maintaining an indigenous research and development capability, industry, and employment. But the challenge is not insurmountable.

Let me highlight the key points:

First, we are trying to tie Alliance efforts closer together by negotiating agreements with individual Allies on cooperation in Defense procurement and R&D that remove restrictions of all sorts on defense trade and cooperation. Under these agreements we will work to open up acquisition processes and share information. Our goal is to maintain and strengthen our own competitive procurement system by allowing our allies to participate, and to increase the effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole by influencing our allies in turn to open up their own national programs to U.S. participation.

Our second approach is to encourage dual production for weapons and equipment—that is, two production lines, one in Europe and one in North America. This concept will provide the best equipment currently available to all Alliance forces, will ensure interoperability in the field, and will eliminate redundant investments in development work. It may also provide lower unit costs for the Alliance as a whole through longer production runs. The **F-16, ROLAND,** and **AIM-9L** programs are examples of dual production.

In the long term, we hope to coordinate our Alliance efforts by dividing responsibilities within various "families" of mission-related weapons. The U.S. for example, could take the lead in developing one type of weapon while the European nations—one or more—could develop a complementary weapon. In this way, unnecessary duplication in Alliance development programs could be avoided. We are now discussing with our NATO Allies a conceptual framework for weapons families in the next generation of several such families: anti-armor weapons, naval mines, anti-ship missiles and air-to-ground weapons.

Of course, this "families of weapons" approach will work only if we can agree on military requirements. To meet that prerequisite, an Alliance Working Group has agreed on the outlines of a Periodic Armaments Planning System which will be tried next year, with possible full implementation in 1980. This planning system should result in early agreement on military needs and follow-on cooperation, within the framework of the main armaments groups of the Council of National Armaments Directors, on approaches to the development of key families of weapons.

To facilitate cooperation between the European and North American parts of the Alliance, our Departments of State and Defense have pursued a dialogue with the Independent European Program Group, which is seeking to rationalize European development and production for better participation on a "two-way street" with the U.S. Our purpose is not to seek a two-way street regardless of cost or capability, but rather to remove artificial barriers to rational defense procurement. There are no quotas on the two-way street, but we are convinced that greater cooperation will increase the traffic both ways.

We also have implemented new procedures within the DoD which ensure that our planning and acquisition processes have the appropriate NATO perspective. In March of last year, I directed issuance of a comprehensive DoD Directive on Alliance Standardization Policy, which assigned specific responsibilities within the Department. Those procedures ensure that we will maintain a better liaison with our allies on armaments, fairly consider allied solutions to Alliance military needs, and offer our Allies suitable participation in our own programs.

Thus we have various plans and efforts underway. But we have no chance of achieving closer cooperation with our allies without continuous teamwork between the Department of Defense and the Congress.

Let me give one example of how our cooperation can be fruitful. Our adoption of the 120mm tank gun developed by the Federal Republic of Germany was the sort of effort the Congress and the Department of Defense must make together to determine the proper direction for our defense. Together we have reached agreement on an action plan which will give us the technical potential to meet the increasing threat, as well as a better chance for Alliance standardization and interoperability in the next generation of tank guns.

We also need the same level of cooperation for two other legislative proposals we have submitted to the Congress. One of those would allow our forces to implement or to continue mutual logistics support arrangements with our allies. The other would reduce obstacles to government-to-government equipment cooperation.

To sum up, we in the Defense Department do not have all the answers to how best improve armaments collaboration in the common interest. But we do know that it is a military imperative if NATO is to achieve and maintain credible deterrence and defense in the 1980s at a cost which free societies can afford. Therefore, we are actively seeking better ways to promote inter-allied collaboration.

The idea of secrecy is not new in the United States; its history dates back to the time of President George Washington. More recently, on June 1, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 29, thereby initiating a "Comprehensive Review of the Classification System" of the Executive Branch.

President Carter directed that a new Executive order be prepared to replace Executive Order 11652 which would establish new governmental policies with respect to the classification, declassification and protection of national security information and, moreover, provide for greater openness in Government consistent with national security interests.

President Carter signed Executive Order 12065 entitled "National Security Information" on June 28, 1978, just about 13 months after he initiated its development. The Order contains many innovative approaches to achieving a more simple and progressive system for the classification, declassification and safeguarding of national security information.

The new Executive Order 12065 became effective on Dec. 1, 1978. Some of its salient features are:

• Under the new Order, a classifier must go through a two-step procedure to arrive at a determination that given information is to be classified. **First,** a classifier must determine that the information concerns one or more of six specific categories of subject matter described in the Order, or that the information concerns another category of subject matter related to the national security which must have been designated as classifiable by an agency head such as the Secretary of Defense or a Secretary of a Military Department. **Second,** the classifier must be able to determine that unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in at least identifiable damage to the national security. Passing the first step leads the classifier to the second step. However, a determination that damage to the national security will occur is by no means an automatic one. To illustrate, vast amounts of information concerning "military plans, weapons or operations," a category of subject matter that may be classified under the new Order, is not classified and will not be because its open disclosure will not damage national security.

• Unlike Executive Order 11652 and previous ones, the new Order treats the matter of derivative classification in explicit terms as it should be. Most security classifications are, of course, derivative in nature.

• In the new Order, the level of classification is divorced from the duration of classification. Without the artificial linkage between level and duration of classification, the classifier is free to consider each of these

aspects of the classification determination on its own merits. In the General Declassification Schedule of the present Order the level and duration of classification are linked together.

• Automatic downgrading of classification appears in Executive Order 12065 as an independent option that may be exercised by original classification authorities when it will serve a useful purpose. In the present Order, automatic downgrading is an integral part of the General Declassification Schedule and it is almost never used in conjunction with exemptions from the General Declassification Schedule. It can be seen readily that the new classification system provides much greater flexibility.

• The new Order reduces the time limits for the duration of classification. A six year norm for classification is established. A Confidential or Secret classification authority can extend classification out to a maximum of six years. A Top Secret classification authority can go out to twenty years but must provide specific reasons for extension of classification beyond the six-year norm. By way of contrast, the present Executive Order 11652 provides six, eight, ten and thirty-year time limits for the classified life-span of information. There is an exception to the norm of six years that pertains to foreign government information which generally will be reviewed for declassification when it becomes 30 years old.

• A fixed date or event for declassification or a date for review for declassification must be shown on all documents classified under the new Executive Order. This was not the case under the previous Order.

By Arthur F. Van Cook

Director of Information Security
Department of Defense

• Under the new Order, portion or paragraph marking is mandatory throughout the Executive Branch whereas it was optional under the previous Order and almost never used outside of the Department of Defense (DoD). It is expected that mandatory portion marking will substantially reduce the proliferation of unnecessary classification. The new Order does provide for the possibility of a waiver of the mandatory portion marking requirements in special cases and with ample justification.

• Executive Order 12065 stipulates that agencies with original classification authority shall promulgate security classification guides to facilitate the identification and uniform classification of information, a matter the previous Order did not treat at all. Security classification guides have been in wide-spread use within DoD for a number of years.

• The mandatory declassification review provisions of the present Order are continued though in revised form. Except for Presidential materials, the ten-year time limit has been removed so that under the new Order it will be possible to request a mandatory declassification review of information that was classified "yesterday." The new Order's provisions are more in conformity with the Freedom of Information Act.

• The Interagency Classification Review Committee established by Executive Order 11652 went out of business on Nov. 30, 1978, and the Information Security Oversight Office went into operation on Dec. 1, 1978. The mission of the Oversight Office is just as its name implies.

• Executive Order 12065 contains new and explicit prohibitions against classification of certain kinds of information and against classification in particular circumstances and for certain purposes. The new Order also continues all the classification prohibitions of the old Order.

• The new Order provides a range of administrative sanctions for knowing and willful violation of any of its provisions. Specifically, officers and employees of the United States Government shall be subject to appropriate administrative sanctions if they knowingly and willfully classify or continue the classification of information in violation of the Order or, without authorization, disclose properly classified information. In contrast, the previous Order merely provided that repeated abuse of the classification process would be grounds for an administrative reprimand.

Thus another chapter of the history of the security classification system began Dec. 1, 1978, when the new Executive Order 12065 became effective. It is anticipated that the Department of Defense implementation of Executive Order 12065, the DoD Information Security Program Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R, will be off the presses soon and it is that document that will govern the Information Security Program within the Department. Notwithstanding, interested readers may wish to refer to the *Federal Register*, Volume 43, No. 128, Monday, July 3, 1978, for the full text of Executive Order 12065.

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CHANGE OF COMMAND

Assignments

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA, has been extended in his position as Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, for an additional year. The 54-year old general completed his second two-year tour at his European post on November 1.

Lt. Gen. James M. Lee, USA, former Chief of Legislative Liaison, Office the Secretary of the Army, has assumed his new duties as Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Southern Europe.

Maj. Gen. Pat W. Crizer, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Readiness Region III, has been picked as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe/Seventh Army. Also, he will be promoted to the grade of lieutenant general.

Maj. Gen. John F. Forrest, USA, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), will become Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command. He has been selected for promotion to lieutenant general.

Retirements

Lt. Gen. John P. Flynn, USAF, Air Force Inspector General, was retired in his present grade on September 29 after more than 32 years of active Service. General Flynn was the highest ranking prisoner of war held by the North Vietnamese from October 1967 until March 1973.

Lt. Gen. Charles J. Simmons, USA, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe/Seventh Army, was retired in his current grade on November 1 after more than 32 years of active Service.

Gen. Haig

Lt. Gen. Flynn

Lt. Gen. Simmons

Lt. Gen. Lee

Maj. Gen. Crizer

Maj. Gen. Forrest

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